More than Just Hot Air: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian Interventions

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Abstract

Do transnational human rights organizations (HROs) influence foreign military intervention onset? We argue that the greater international exposure of human suffering through HRO "naming and shaming" activities starts a process of mobilization and opinion change in the international community that ultimately increases the likelihood of humanitarian military intervention. We test the empirical implication of the argument on a sample of all non-Western countries from 1990 to 2005. The results suggest that HRO shaming makes humanitarian intervention more likely even after controlling for several other covariates of intervention decisions. Further, the suggested effect of HROs holds when we use just the general count of all shaming reports by HROs in the popular press or weigh this count by the intensity of the negative shaming message. Finally, HRO activities appear to have a significant impact on the likelihood of military missions by IGOs as well as interventions led by third party states.

Humanitarian military interventions are potentially costly endeavors for intervener countries due to the low toleration of the public for casualties, and the high economic and political risks involved in military operations (Mueller 1973; Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner et al. 2004).[1] Despite the significant risks that interventions involve for the interveners, the external use of force for humanitarian reasons remains to be a popular foreign policy tool in the post-cold war era, justified often by ideas about the world community's "responsibility to protect" civilians in harm's way (Thakur and Weiss 2009). From 1990 to 2005, on average more than ten military operations occurred a year for largely humanitarian goals (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). These goals range from ending civil wars to preventing genocides, to rebuilding failed states, or to promoting human rights and democracy.

Given both the possible high risks for interveners and the potential benefits for the targeted countries, what determines when humanitarian interventions take place and when the world community chooses, for better or worse, to sit on the sidelines and not intervene? In other words, what leads to "boots on the ground" for humanitarian reasons? Most existing explanations of the determinants of intervention decisions tend to be state-centric and focus on geo-political and economic factors, often ignoring the potential of non-state actors to influence

[1] In this study, we define humanitarian armed intervention as "the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied" (Holzgrefe 2003, 18). We therefore exclude foreign military interventions in a country to offer assistance during natural disasters and to evacuate foreign nationals. We exclude those cases because we are particularly interested in the question of whether external actors are willing to use force to protect the citizens of another country facing threats to their basic human rights and physical security. Further, we are interested in whether and under what conditions interventions occur for humanitarian objectives from any actor in the international community, regardless of whether it is led by the UN or other intergovernmental organizations or a state. This is consistent with the growing "responsibility to project" norm: regardless of who is the intervener, it is argued that state and non-state actors in the world community should respond (Thakur and Weiss 2009).

foreign policy decision making regarding intervention (Fordham 2008a; Beardsley and Schmidt 20012; Choi 2012). Other literature highlights the possibility of a "CNN effect" on intervention decision-making, where emotional coverage of both humanitarian disasters and military casualties in global media outlets has been argued to "drive…policy formulation" (Robinson 2011, 2). To date, however, empirical support of a general media effect on intervention decision-making has been scant and recent literature on media effects has stressed the need for examining alternative "global networks" through which information is produced and disseminated in ways that could influence foreign policymaking (Gilboa 2005, 337).

In this paper, we focus on one particular alternative "global network" of information: the work of human rights non-governmental organizations (human rights INGOs or, as used hereafter HROs).[2] We argue that the information produced by HROs is a special corollary of the supposed "CNN effect" on foreign policymaking and can drive the decision of humanitarian intervention. Human rights organizations, like the well-known Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, work to improve human rights mainly through the strategic reporting of stories on grave human rights situations. Many HROs collect information on abuses and work to "name and shame" or "shame and blame" a targeted regime in the popular press, mobilizing others to take actions to protect a repressed population (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie and Davis 2012). Human Rights Watch, for instance, was a frequent source of information on the human rights atrocities in Libya under the Gaddafi regime. After the fighting first intensified in February of 2011, Washington director of Human Rights Watch, Tom Malinowski, called on the United States and other developed countries to act to stop the "ongoing massacre in Libya." When the

[2] We define human rights INGOs as any non-profit organization that has a mission statement consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is not controlled by a government, and has an international presence (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

UN Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of military forces to protect civilians in Libya in March 2011, Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth remarked that the Security Council had "at last lived up to its duty." Other organizations have released reports of human rights atrocities and called for foreign policy actions in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Nepal, among other locations, in the last 20 years.

We therefore argue that there is an "Amnesty International effect": human rights organizations influence the likelihood of humanitarian armed interventions. Unlike the general media, HROs are often highly credible actors and work to directly mobilize action related to the "responsibility to protect." As such, even after taking the actual human rights situation within the country and its general media coverage into account, when HROs increase attention of human rights abuses through "naming and shaming" strategy, it is more likely that the world community will take notice and intervene, either unilaterally or as part of a collective international effort. Our argument does not rest on whether HROs are actively calling for military intervention or not; simply by bringing attention to a human rights situation, HROs are providing information and mobilizing in ways that can sway foreign policy decision-making in favor of a humanitarian intervention.

We test the empirical implication of our argument on a sample of all non-Western countries from 1990 to 2005. In line with our argument, we find that HRO shaming makes humanitarian intervention more likely, even after accounting for several other covariates of intervention decisions. We find that the expected effect of HROs holds both when we use the general count of all shaming reports by HROs in the popular press or weigh this count by the intensity of the negative shaming message (Goldstein 1992). We also find that HRO activities

have significant impact on the likelihood of humanitarian military missions by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as well as interventions led by third party states.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we expand on the background literature and then provide the theoretical argument and the testable hypothesis that flows from this framework. In the research design section, we discuss the data and model specification, followed by the discussion of the findings from the data analysis. We conclude with discussing the implications of this research on our extant understandings of the media effect, foreign policymaking, and HRO behavior.

Determinants of Humanitarian Intervention

Our theoretical argument of an "Amnesty International effect" draws on literatures concerning intervention onset, the media and foreign policy, and human rights transnational advocacy. To begin, a variety of political and economic factors have been argued to affect the likelihood of armed interventions. Much of the literature is divided on whether the severity of the crisis at hand or the strategic importance of the location where the crisis is occurring matter for intervention, with many studies finding some combination of these determinants to be at play (Fordham 2002; Mullenbach 2005; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Rost and Grieg 2011; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Choi 2012). For example, Rost and Grieg (2011) find that non-major power states are more likely to intervene as peacekeepers after civil wars in states that are former colonies and alliance partners. Mullenbach (2005) finds that alliances to major powers reduce the likelihood of a third-party intervention and that, in general, peacekeeping is less likely in major power states. Mullenbach and Matthews (2008), focusing specifically into US interventions into civil wars, find that non-democracies and those proximate to the US are more

likely to have conflicts which are intervened in. Fordham (2008a) finds that rival behavior and economics, through influencing alliance patterns, matter for the US decision to intervene in both civil conflicts and interstate crises.

Recently, two pieces have stressed aspects of the severity of the crisis as determinants of interventions. First, Beardsley and Schmidt (2012), focusing on UN involvement in international crises, show that the severity of the crisis and the possibility of its escalation matter more for the likelihood of UN involvement than the "parochial interests of the five veto-holding members of the UN Security Council" (46). Second, Choi (2012) finds that US humanitarian interventions are more likely in states with poor human rights records and with more media reports about human rights; Choi (2012) does not find any evidence in support of oil or natural resource supplies driving the likelihood of intervention. These two pieces reflect earlier work concerning how UN peacekeepers are often sent to the most difficult cases, in line with an overall humanitarian mission (Fortna 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008).

Beyond these political and economic determinants of intervention, some work has examined whether emotive press coverage of humanitarian crises, often termed as the "CNN effect," is "capable of independently driving and influencing policy formulation, at times against the interests and wishes of foreign-policy establishments" (Robinson 2011, 2; 1999; 2000; Jakobsen 1996, 2000; Livingston 1997; Gilboa 2005). Theoretically, as media coverage generates more public interest on an issue, voters, interest groups and other influential domestic actors will appeal to leaders to take action. This media-driven public pressure will create a policy imperative for politicians to "do something" to satisfy citizens' expectations and avoid media criticism. If this press coverage concerns human rights abuses or mass atrocities, it follows that

this information will help embolden public demands for government action to help a repressed population (Jakobsen 2000; Robinson 2000; 2002).

The suggested effect of the media was largely touted in the 1990s, as many popular writings and foreign policy experts mentioned the role of the media in driving foreign policy. For example, then UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali commented in 1995 that CNN was effectively an additional member of the UN Security Council. Prior to the 1993 "Blackhawk Down" coverage of American casualties in Somalia and the international community's inaction in the Rwanda genocide in 1994, much of the discussion of the CNN effect was that it would make humanitarian actions more likely.

Despite the strong theoretical appeal of the media effect argument, most studies conclude that the effect of news coverage of human suffering on armed interventions is very limited (Strobel 1997; Jakobsen 2000; Robinson 2000; Gilboa 2005).Robinson (2011), in a recent review of the literature, concludes that the "majority of researchers would agree that news media do not have the transformative influence attributed to them at the height of the 1990s CNN effect debate" (5). Other scholars point out that the news media is partisan, elite driven, and motivated by profits (Entman 2004; Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Baum and Groeling 2009; Groeling and Baum 2009). As such, the media may not be a unified mover of public opinion and may have interests that already match elite opinions on an issue or produce divergent public pressure, perhaps leading to overall inaction. Because of this, the effect of the general media as a driver of foreign policy may be overstated, including its role in driving humanitarian interventions (Robinson 2011).

Our study complements and adds to the relevant literatures on armed interventions and news media effects by focusing on the possible impact of a specific set of non-state actors

(HROs) on the likelihood of humanitarian interventions. More specifically, we argue that the work of human rights organization often provides the agenda for mass media coverage and the information these organizations produce can serve as a motivator for foreign policy action, including humanitarian interventions into mass atrocities. Further, HROs can be direct mobilizers for public action and can work directly with foreign policy decision-makers. In the following section, we develop a theoretical framework that explains the causal relationship between HRO shaming and the initiation of humanitarian missions.

The Role of Human Rights Organizations in Humanitarian Intervention Decisions

Underpinning all of the diverse literature of a possible media effect on intervention decision-making is the assumption that there is actually news to report. For emotional stories of human suffering to make it to CNN and other news sources, someone has to be collecting and disseminating this information. Now, of course, traditional journalists often put themselves in harm's way to cover a humanitarian news story (Taback and Coupland 2006). And, as it is often said in the news business, "if it bleeds, it leads"; news agencies may have an incentive to report on anything particularly gruesome (Earl et al. 2004). However, there is much evidence of journalists leaving particularly disastrous locations, including most leaving Sri Lanka prior to the 2009 civilian atrocities during heightened civil conflict. When journalists have already fled or when journalists are interested in background information themselves on a particular violent situation, who can provide this information?

The extant literature on human rights organizations is clear that HROs work to provide information about human rights abuses to the global community, especially during times of severe conflict and human rights disasters when international journalists may have already left a

war-torn area (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ron et al. 2005; Murdie and Davis 2012). Theoretically, as part of a larger transnational network, the organizations respond to calls by repressed populations and then disseminate information to increase both IGO and third party state attention to the situation through a "shaming and blaming" or "naming and shaming" strategy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). By "naming" the perpetrators of abuses and "shaming" them in the popular press, organizations hope to expand a transnational network of actors that will ultimately influence the decision calculus of the repressive regime. Bob (2005) has even argued that organizations only respond the most news worthy of populations. Although the power of HROs may be "soft," through influencing these third party actors, "hard" political actions could be undertaken to help the repressive population. Past work has found that shaming by HROs can influence the decision of states to place economic sanctions on a repressive regime (Murdie and Peksen 2012) and shaming by UN actors has been linked to changes in foreign aid (Lebovic and Voeten 2009). In short, HROs are considered influential actors for transnational advocacy and serve as agenda setters when it comes to human rights action. The information they produce is frequently compiled and released on a global scale (Ron et al 2005).

Now, to be clear, HROs vary in their actual calls for intervention. Some have been outright advocates of military interventions in the past; many groups actively supported the 1991 intervention in Iraq, Somalia in 1993, and recent action in Sudan (Kaldor 2001; Sudan Tribune 2012). Others have been outspoken opponents against any sort of military action, including the hundreds of organizations that came out against US intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the group African Rights, which actually broke away from Human Rights Watch over opposition to military intervention in Sudan in 1993, which volunteers of African Rights contend "was not designed to address Somalia's real problems and was in fact destined to make things worse." (AR 2012). The then-secretary general of Amnesty International, arguably the largest and most

influential human rights organization (Wong 2012; Murdie 2012), even said in 2000 that the organization does "not call for military action, nor …oppose it, but [does] campaign on how such interventions should be conducted" (2000).

Our argument, however, does not rest on whether the organization is actively in support of intervention or not: the information that HROs produce is especially designed to motivate public opinion and sway others to join the cause to "do something" in the name of helping the repressed population. Regardless of whether other actions of the HRO are to influence the nature of this action, the information alone against a repressive regime should embolden international community responses. This is clear in the canonical literature on how HROs are supposed to work to improve human rights in a repressive state (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

Although this argument may seem straightforward, it flies in stark contrast to many of the dominant theoretical arguments about foreign policy decision-making and the general influence of non-state actors on state behavior (Snyder et al 2003; Waltz 1979). Many HROs have negligible budgets and most are not "at the table" when it comes to even minor foreign policy decisions, let alone the decision of a country to put its troops in harm's way for humanitarian purposes (Fitzduff and Church 2004). Classic realists would contend that all these issues just confirm the limited importance of non-state actors in a state-centric world; as Waltz (1979) contends, "so long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined by them" (94). Realists often see HROs as simply instruments of the state; as such, the influence of the information produced by HROs should not be influential in foreign policy decision-making once the underlying political and economic factors are accounted for (Geeraerts 1995).

With all this going against a likely effect, then why should the information produced by HROs matter for the decision to intervene within a country? First, we argue that HROs are often seen as highly credible actors in a sea of misinformation. Because of this, unlike general news reports which may be seen as partisan or elite-led, reports that cite a HRO will be more likely to be believed, leading to a more likely change in public opinion and/or pressure on action on behalf of the repressed population. This is not to say that exaggerations or misinformation by HROs do not occur but that organizations have very real constraints on their ability to exaggerate and need credibility in order to gain supporters (Gourevetich and Lake 2012). Reports of incredible stories or partisan biases make front-page news and can constrict support (Gugerty and Prakash 2010; Shaviv 2012).

In general, the public has more confidence in HROs and related organizations than in television or government. This is illustrated in Table 1, which provides the summary results of questions asked to individuals about their confidence in various aspects of society in the World Values Survey between 1995 and 2008. As the table shows, globally, 62.49% of individuals say their confidence in "charitable or humanitarian organizations," the closest categorization in the World Values Survey to HROs, is "quite a lot" or "a great deal." Only 47.18% say something similar about television and 47.21% say the same thing about government. The disparity between confidence in organizations and confidence in either the government or television is even greater in Western countries, which could be argued to be the likely sources of any global push for humanitarian intervention. 65.45% of individuals in Western countries have "quite a lot" or "a great deal" of confidence in organizations, compared to only 36.3% of individuals in Western countries who could say the same thing about television and 41.81% who could say something similar about their confidence in government. We think these survey results help

illustrate the potential power of HRO information. Even though HROs are being argued to work through the same general causal pathway that is supposed to link CNN and other news outlets to foreign policy action, on the whole, HROs are more credible actors. As such, stories and reports that cite HROs should be especially important movers of action for humanitarian purposes, including foreign military interventions.

Further, HROs also have made their organizational survival rest on providing poignant, vivid accounts of human rights atrocities, often directly from those affected by the situation. Many HRO reports are the most troubling about an atrocity, providing a real name and face to a foreign and distant situation. Because of this, these accounts could be among the most memorable ones for the general public, providing a focal point for action (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). And, unlike the examples of both the benefits and costs of intervention in the general media (Jakobsen 2000), HRO information is more likely to be in one direction: for action – any action – in support of the civilian population where the atrocities are occurring. HRO reports are unlikely to include accounts of the potential military costs of intervention. In fact, we read all accounts of shaming by HROs in our dataset, discussed below, for the years 2004 and 2005 and did not find any evidence that HROs were reporting on the potential costs to the intervening state of a possible intervention.

Finally, HROs can couple their shaming efforts with other forms of mobilization in support of action on behalf of the targeted state, including directly working with policymakers or urging their members to take actions on their behalf (Fitzduff and Church 2004). As such, unlike news media outlets that are not directly pushing foreign policy leaders to take certain policy positions, some HROs will couple their information with direct interaction with policy leaders and mobilization campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998). For example, in the 1980s, as Forsythe

(1999) discusses, many HROs, including Amnesty International and the organizations now referred to as Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First, met with the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations (125-126). HROs frequently testify in hearings in the US Congress; since 2008, when Congress created the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, HROs have been included in hearings and briefings almost bimonthly.[3] Similarly, HROs have frequently testified in the Canadian House of Commons and the UK Foreign Affairs Committee, including Amnesty International UK recently providing evidence of human rights abuses in Libya. In a recent written report to the UK Foreign Affairs committee, for example, Amnesty International recommended that "The UK Government must put human rights at the top of its agenda likewise in its relations" with the Libyan government ("Further Written Evidence From Amnesty International UK" 2001).

In short, this line of reasoning implies a testable hypothesis: *even after accounting for political/economic factors and any media effect, information by HROs should still increase the likelihood of humanitarian military intervention.* The rest of this paper tests this proposition using a large sample of non-Western states in the post-cold war time period.

Research Design

To statistically examine the impact of HRO shaming on armed humanitarian interventions, we gathered time-series, cross-section data for the 1990-2005 period, inclusive. The country-year is the unit of analysis. That is, each datum represents a country *i* in a given year *t*. In order to avoid any bias resulting from case selection, the data analysis excludes all western liberal democracies from the analysis. Liberal democracies are unlikely targets of interventions since the likelihood

[3] See http://tlhrc.house.gov/

of complex humanitarian emergencies in democratic countries are considerably lower than countries with low respect for political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Pickering 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Overall, the data analysis includes 129 countries for which the data are fully available.

Outcome Variable: Armed Humanitarian Interventions

We use data on armed humanitarian interventions from the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset. The IMI dataset was originally created by Pearson and Baumann (1993) for the period 1946-1988. Using the same coding guidelines, Pickering and Kisangani (2009) extended the original dataset for the post-1988 period. The IMI dataset offers the most comprehensive temporal and spatial coverage of foreign military interventions.[4] Military intervention is defined as "the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute" (Pearson and Baumann 1993, 4). The IMI considers only purposeful, politically salient military actions initiated by the regular military forces of the intervening state. Hence, several forms of foreign military actions are excluded from the dataset, including: random or accidental border skirmishes; international arms shipments; the use of troops for non-

[4] Although the other notable general intervention datasets – Militarized Interstate Dispute (Ghosn et al. 2004), Military Intervention by Powerful States (Sullivan and Koch 2009), and Tillema's (1991) military intervention data– include hostile use of force against the state actors, they exclude several types of intervention cases such as humanitarian interventions, military operations supporting the target government, or the use of force against non-state actors. The IMI is also the best fit for our study because it is the only general military intervention dataset that distinguishes whether an intervention opposes the target government, supports it, or is neutral (Pickering and Kisangani 2009).

forceful purposes; and the presence of foreign troops stationed in military bases, unless they engage in direct combat in the target country (Pearson and Baumann 1993:4-6).

As noted above, in this study we focus on non-consensual armed interferences with the goal of mitigating and/or ending ongoing humanitarian crises. To correspond with this definition, we created a dichotomous *Humanitarian Intervention* variable based on the information from the "social-protective intervention" and "humanitarian intervention" variables in the IMI dataset. The *Humanitarian Intervention* variable takes the value of one for the year a humanitarian intervention is initiated in a country and zero otherwise. According to the IMI, the social-protective interventions involve all armed operations with the stated goal of protecting minority groups facing severe socio-economic, military or political threat to their physical security. The humanitarian missions, on the other hand, involve military deployments with such goals as saving lives, relieving suffering, and providing assistance during complex humanitarian emergencies such as civil wars and genocides.

The IMI also considers the deployment of military forces to provide assistance during natural disasters and to evacuate foreign nationals from a country as humanitarian interventions. Specific examples include the US and NATO troop deployment to give humanitarian aid to Pakistan after a major earthquake in 2004, and the British and French military involvement to evacuate foreign nationals from Albania during the 1997 domestic unrest. Those cases are excluded from the analysis since we are particularly interested in the question of whether external actors are inclined to use force to protect the citizens of another country facing threats to their basic human rights and physical security.

We created two additional dichotomous variables, *IGO-led Humanitarian Intervention* and *Non-IGO Humanitarian Intervention*. We use these variables to examine whether the impact

of HRO shaming has a similar effect on the likelihood of IGO-led and non-IGO humanitarian missions. *IGO-led Humanitarian Intervention* accounts for humanitarian operations conducted under the auspices of regional or global intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the United Nations, European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *Non-IGO Humanitarian Intervention* is comprised of military missions led by individual countries without any IGO involvement. Overall, based on the coding decisions outlined above, we identified 65 humanitarian interventions during the years between 1990 and 2005, inclusive. 48 of those interventions were under the command of an IGO while 17 of them were military operations by individual countries without any IGO involvement. Further, in the data there are 27 different countries faced at least one humanitarian intervention during the time period of the analysis.

Covariates of Humanitarian Interventions

To assess the impact of HRO shaming on the likelihood of humanitarian interventions, we use two different measures, *HRO Shaming (count)* and *HRO Shaming (intensity)*. These measures were developed by Murdie (2009) and Murdie and Davis (2012). They account for all negative HRO events directed at a country in a given year that are captured in Reuters Global News Service. The data are originally collected by the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) project and were provided by Virtual Research Associates (Bond et al. 2003; King and Lowe 2003).

The *HRO Shaming (count)* variable captures the number of shaming events in Reuters Global News Service from directed at a government or government agent. The event is determined to be shaming if it can be coded as "conflictual" using the Goldstein (1992) scale of the level of conflict and cooperation standard in events data. The data captures these events for

over 1,100 HROs, as identified by their mission statements in the 2008 *Yearbook of International Organizations*, the standard reference for international nongovernmental organization (INGO) data (Boli and Thomas 1999). We use the shaming count to explore whether the number of naming and shaming events increases the probability of an external armed intervention with humanitarian motives. Our second measure, *HRO Shaming (intensity)*, captures the intensity of total shaming events. Intensity here comes from the Goldstein (1992) scale; this scale has been reversed so that a more intensively negative shaming event would be given a higher weight on the scale. We use the intensity measure to investigate whether the extent of critical statements and actions by HROs increase the probability of a humanitarian intervention in a potential target country.

One important issue that requires attention here is the possible reciprocal causation (i.e., simultaneity bias) between HRO activities and the initiation of humanitarian interventions. To reduce any simultaneity bias, we went back to the HRO shaming events and eliminated any events in the dataset that occur after the actual date of intervention, as provided in the Pickering and Kisangani (2009) dataset. As such, the HRO shaming variable cannot be argued to be caused by the intervention since it came first chronologically. Results are consistent, however, if this action is not done, but we think this practice could be seen as a useful example of the benefits of events data approaches (Bond et al 2003).

To avoid the omitted variable bias, we also include several other major covariates of humanitarian interventions on the right hand side of the equation. To account for the impact of the overall level of human rights violations, we include the *Human Rights* variable, which is the *Political Terror Scale (PTS)* (Gibney et al. 2010). Countries with significant human rights abuses are more likely to be involved in interstate militarized conflict (Sobek et al. 2006) and experience

internal violent conflicts and civilian sufferings (Thoms and Ron 2007). This increases the prospect of humanitarian military operations.

The PTS data include two index variables, which are five-point ordered indices that provide information regarding the magnitude and severity of abuses of physical integrity rights, including disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, and execution. The indices range from one to five where higher scores indicate a higher level of human rights abuses. The two indices are based on two separate data sources, including the country reports about human rights abuses by the US State Department and Amnesty International. In this article, the State Department index was used, which covers more countries and time points to consider in the analysis. However, following the earlier practice (e.g. Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport and Armstrong 2004), for the countries where the State Department data were missing but available in Amnesty International, the missing values were replaced in the State Department indicator by using the index for Amnesty International data.[5]

To explore the impact of news media coverage on the probability of armed missions with humanitarian motives, we use two different measures. The first measure, *Media Exposure*, controls for the total number of reports about a country appearing in Reuters Global News Service in a given year (Murdie and Davis 2012; Bell, Clay, Murdie 2012). We use the natural log of this variable to correct for the skewness of the data. The second media variable, *Negative News Media Coverage*, focuses only on news media coverage concerning human rights violations. This variable controls for the total number of media reports appearing in the

[5] There was no change in the main findings when we replace the PTS score with the Physical Integrity Rights Index (Cingranelli and Richards 2010), another commonly used quantitative measure of integrity rights violations. We also estimated models with interaction terms between the HRO shaming variables and the targeted country's human rights score to capture any conditional effect of the HRO shaming on the likelihood of interventions. The interaction terms were not statistically significant in any of the models.

Economist and *Newsweek* with the keywords "human rights." The data come from Ramos et al. (2007). Because the data are available until 2000, the time frame for the models controlling for *Negative News Media Coverage* is from 1990 to 2000.[6]

More news media coverage of a country, especially negative media coverage, will create more international awareness of socio-economic and political problems in the country. This might in turn raise international mobilization in support of helping a population suffering from violence, discrimination, and repression. As such, as new media coverage increases, individuals in third-party states are more likely to demand that their leaders act to help a population facing humanitarian problems in the targeted state (Robinson 1999; 2000). With the growing demand by the public to do something, leaders might be more willing to resort to armed forces to mitigate or end an ongoing humanitarian emergency in another country.

Countries with strong economic and military capabilities are less likely targets of military intervention (Pickering 2002). This is due to their ability to deter adverse military interventions from neighboring states or major powers in the international system. Moreover, states with strong socio-economic and military capabilities are more effective in avoiding domestic instabilities (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Even when they face national emergencies, they are less likely to need foreign military assistance. To account for *State Capacity*, we use the Correlates of

[6] It is worth pointing out that the negative media coverage variable is not highly correlated with the HRO shaming count (0.27) and intensity (0. 23) variables. This should not be surprising since the shaming variables are much more comprehensive than the negative media coverage variable in capturing the extent of human suffering in potential target countries. The negative media coverage variable relies only on two Northern media outlets and, more importantly, underestimates the extent of humanitarian problems by neglecting accounts of human rights abuses without the keywords "human rights." The shaming measures also capture a very specific set of actors (HROs) instead of any general reports using these keywords. Similarly, the media exposure variable that accounts for the total number of news reports has a relatively low correlation with the HRO shaming count (0.25) and intensity (0.15) variables. Further, as the models reported below suggest, the inclusion or exclusion of the media variables has no significant impact on the main findings.

War's (COW) the Composite Indicator of National Capability index, which includes total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure (Singer 1987). The *State Capacity* variable is logged to correct for the skewness of the data.

Earlier research finds that democratic states are less frequent targets of military intervention (Pickering 2002). Liberal democratic states tend to experience fewer domestic instabilities, including ethnic or civil wars (Gurr and Moore 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2003) or humanitarian crises such as genocides and famines (Rummel 1995; Krain 1997; Harff 2003), which reduces the possibility of military interference. Because democratic states are also often major military or economic powers due to their developed economies and superior technological capacities, they also require less external military support during national emergencies (Pickering 2002, 298-299; Reiter and Stam 1998; Lake 1992). The *Democracy* variable is the polity score derived from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2000) and each country's democracy score ranges from -10 to 10, where 10 represents the highest level of democracy.

The *Oil Producer* variable is a dichotomous measure that takes the value of 1 if a country receives more than one-third of its export revenues from oil exports and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the possibility that oil-rich countries undergoing humanitarian emergencies are more likely to face an armed intervention. External actors might be more inclined to intervene in an oil-rich country not only to prevent an ongoing humanitarian crisis but also to promote or protect their national interests through ensuring a secure and stable supply of oil.

The *Ethnic Fractionalization* variable accounts for the suggested positive relationship between ethno-linguistic diversity and violence. It varies from 0 (total homogeneity) to 1 (total heterogeneity). Ethnically divided societies are more prone to internal conflicts (e.g. Horowitz

1985; Gurr 1994; Ellingsen 2000). Under the presence of many culturally distinct communities or high social fractionalization, it will be more difficult to form and hold together peaceful coalitions among different groups. The lack of cooperation among different groups will likely increase the likelihood of tendencies among the groups towards using violent methods to gain political and economic power. The growing violent conflicts will, in turn, increase the likelihood of foreign armed involvement to end or prevent ethnic violence.

The model also includes the squared term of ethnic fractionalization, *Ethnic Fractionalization Squared*, to control for the possible curvilinear association between ethnic diversity and the likelihood of foreign interventions. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2000) claim that if a social group or a few groups hold the majority of the total population, the likelihood of inter-communal conflict and discrimination raises to considerably high levels, which might subsequently trigger external intervention. In the societies where a group has the dominant position, the dominant group will gain more political leverage against other smaller communities that will consequently facilitate the dominant group's use of repressive and discriminatory measures against the other small communities. The data for oil and ethnic fractionalization are from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

A *Civil War* dummy variable accounts for the presence of violent insurgencies in a country. *Civil War* is coded as 1 if a country experiences a civil war with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and 0 otherwise. Third-party military interventions are more likely to occur in war-torn societies to reduce the human cost of the violence, cease the conflict between the state and rebel forces, or to undermine any possible negative spillover effects of civil wars threatening the regional stability such as massive population displacement (Regan 2000). We

use the list of intrastate armed conflicts collected by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Strand et al. 2005).

Methodological Approach

Before reporting the findings from the data analysis, there are a few methodological issues that need to be addressed. We estimate the models using two different methods, rare events logistic regression (King and Zeng 2001) and a generalized estimating equation (GEE). We use rare event logistic regression since humanitarian interventions are rare events in the data set. Given the relatively short time span of the analysis (16 years), we also use the GEE technique as a robustness check to confirm that the time frame of the models does not bias the results. The GEE method has been shown as the most appropriate method for temporally limited panel data with significant number of spatial units (Liang and Zeger 1986; Horton and Lipsitz 1999; Zorn 2001).

We include a count variable, *Past Intervention*, which accounts for the years since the last humanitarian intervention in a country. This measure allows us to control for the possibility that a country that faced a humanitarian intervention in its recent history is a more likely target of a new intervention. This variable also helps us correct for the autoregressive process (temporal dependence) in the models, which is a common issue when cross-sectional time-series data are utilized (Beck and Katz 1995). Alternatively, when we use a one-year lag of the dependent variables for temporal dependence, there was no major change in the results. However, a lagged dependent variable is less appropriate in our case because of the non-linear nature of our binary humanitarian intervention variables that do not contain sufficient information for lagging.

All models are estimated using Huber-White corrected robust standard errors (clustered on countries) to deal with the heteroscedasticity problem. To reduce simultaneity bias and make sure that the independent variables precede the dependent variable, we lag the right-hand side variables one year, except those that are time invariant. We do not lag the media coverage variables since they only include the HRO events that occur until the actual date of intervention and hence precede armed interventions chronologically. Finally, diagnostic tests revealed that there was no issue with multicolinearity in any of the estimations.

[Table 2 about here]

Findings

Table 2 reports the models examining the impact of the number of HRO shaming events on the onset of humanitarian missions. The first two models are estimated with rare event logistic regression, while the other two models are estimated with the GEE technique. In models 1 and 3 we use the media exposure variable to capture the overall number of news reporting on each country in a given year. In models 2 and 4, we replace the media exposure variable with the negative media coverage measure. The results in Table 2 lend strong support for our assertion that HRO shaming activities increase the probability of humanitarian interventions. The findings on the significant effect of HRO shaming events on humanitarian operations are robust to the use of rare event logistic and the GEE method.

[Table 3 about here]

[Table 4 about here]

Table 3 reports the results from the models using the HRO shaming intensity variable. Similar to the results in Table 2, we find a statistically significant association between the intensity of HRO shaming events and the occurrence of humanitarian interventions. Similar to the findings in Table 2, the result for the shaming intensity variable is robust to the use of rare event logistic regression and the GEE methods. Thus, we find additional support for the theoretical expectation that HROs and their activities are crucial in influencing the foreign policy behavior of leaders in third-part countries during humanitarian crises in other countries.

Table 4 report the substantive impact of the shaming variables and the other significant covariates of the onset of humanitarian intervention using the estimates in Tables 2 and 3. More specifically, we examine the change in the predicted probability of humanitarian intervention once we increase the dichotomous variables from 0 to 1 and the average value of the continuous variables by one standard deviation, holding all other continuous variables at their means and the binary variables at their medians. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the mean values of the shaming count and intensity variables increase the predicted probability of humanitarian intervention by 67% and 83%, respectively. These numbers suggest that the shaming variables have significant substantive impact in predicting the onset of humanitarian missions. A one standard deviation increase in the average values of the human rights and media exposure variables, on the other hand, the probability of humanitarian intervention goes up by 183% and 166%, respectively. The same amount of increase in the mean values of the state capacity and past intervention measures decrease the predicted probability of intervention by 67% and 33%, respectively.

[Table 5 about here]

[Table 6 about here]

In Tables 5 and 6, we expand the analysis by exploring whether HRO activities have any differential impact on the likelihood of IGO-led and non-IGO interventions. The first two models in Table 5 report the results for the effect that the number of HRO activities has on the likelihood of IGO-led interventions. The third and fourth models, on the other hand, show the effect that the number of HRO activities has on the probability of non-IGO interventions. The results indicate that HRO activities increase the probability of IGO-led as well as non-IGO humanitarian missions. The models in Table 6 show the effect that the shaming intensity variable has on the possibility of interventions initiated by IGOs and individual countries. Except the third model for non-IGO interventions, we find that as the intensity of shaming activities increases, the likelihood of humanitarian operations by IGOs and individual countries is likely to go up considerably. Overall, the findings in Tables 5 and 6 reveal that HRO shaming is likely to be influential in the unilateral interventions decisions by countries and in the multilateral military operations coordinated by IGOs.

Conclusion

Human rights organizations produce information that can be especially informative about human rights abuses in many locations throughout the world. Organizations are largely seen as credible actors and their information can be influential in foreign policy. Although these statements are often rhetorically agreed to by a host of foreign policy experts, many doubt the ability of human rights organizations to actually matter on realpolitik issues, like the foreign policy decision of humanitarian intervention (Hafner-Burton 2008; Drezner 2012).

In this study, we argue and show empirically that HROs do matter for foreign policy decision-making concerning humanitarian military action. Somewhat akin to the supposed CNN

effect, HROs produce information which is poignant and vivid, starting a process of mobilization and opinion change which ultimately can increase the likelihood of humanitarian intervention into a civilian atrocity. For human rights advocates supporting a "responsibility to protect" doctrine in foreign policy, this research provides some evidence of the process through which non-state actors can influence the likelihood of an international community response to save lives.

Our findings add to the cumulative knowledge of the determinants of humanitarian interventions and also contribute to the general intervention literature, which has not empirically linked HROs and other non-state actors to intervention decision-making writ large. This work also adds to the news media and foreign policy literature by stressing how a very particular news source (shaming by HROs) will lead to an increase in the likelihood of humanitarian intervention. The empirical support to this argument reiterates recent calls within the news media effect literature to focus on particular actors and information networks, and their influence while simultaneously controlling for a host of political and economic factors making interventions more likely (Gilboa 2005; Robinson 2011).

This work highlights the process through which HROs work to influence human rights and stop mass atrocities. The canonical theories of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) rest on the idea that HRO actions will cause international community responses. We provide a fully-fleshed argument as to how HROs would matter for intervention decision-making and provide large scale empirical evidence of this process. This would be in line with other recent work on how shaming by HROs and IGOs can influence other foreign policy decisions (Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Murdie and Peksen 2012).

Worth noting, however, there is a growing literature on the influence of humanitarian interventions on human rights and the ending of mass killings (Krain 2005; Murdie and Davis 2010; Kathman and Wood 2011; Peksen 2012; DeMerritt 2012). Much of this work provides limitations on when interventions will actually help human rights and generally finds that not all interventions are structured in ways that will lead to improvements in a country's human rights performance. These findings may highlight the importance of HRO efforts to directly work to influence the nature of military interventions, like Amnesty International tries to do by encouraging specific human rights programming in existing interventions.

In short, HROs are conduits of powerful stories of civilian atrocities. Through their production of information on repressive regimes, this seemingly powerless actor actually influences the movements of troops across borders for humanitarian purposes.

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Table 1: Confidence in Various Information Sources, 1995-2008

	"A Great Deal"	"Quite a Lot"	"Not Very Much"	"None at All"
Confidence: The Government	13.73%	33.48%	37.25%	15.5%
Confidence: The Government (Respondents in Western Countries Only)	4.50%	37.31%	43.95%	14.24%
Confidence: Television	11.24%	35.94%	41.07%	11.75%
Confidence: Television (Respondents in Western Countries Only)	2.77%	33.55%	51.54%	12.14%
Confidence: Charitable or Humanitarian Organizations	16.88%	45.61%	28.74%	8.78%
Confidence: Charitable or Humanitarian Organizations (Respondents in Western Countries Only)	11.87%	53.57%	28.73%	5.82%

NOTE: Calculations based on data from the World Values1981-2008 Official Aggregate, v20090901, 2009. Figures given are for only for respondents that were asked and provided responses to questions *e069_10, e069_11*, and *e069_40*. Results of the full sample are similar in breakdown. Countries included in the sample are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Vietnam, Slovenia, South African, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Great Britain, United States, Burkina Faso, Uruguay, and Zambia.

Table 2. HRO Shaming and Humanitarian Interventions

	Rare Event Logit		Logit with GEE	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
HRO Shaming (count)	0.525***	0.569***	0.558***	0.587***
	(0.133)	(0.212)	(0.134)	(0.222)
Human Rights	0.912***	0.934***	0.951***	0.982***
	(0.239)	(0.209)	(0.241)	(0.209)
Media Exposure	0.543**		0.561**	
	(0.244)		(0.247)	
Negative News Media Coverage		0.002		-0.069
		(0.099)		(0.114)
State Capacity	-0.817***	-0.593***	-0.869***	-0.639***
	(0.241)	(0.173)	(0.244)	(0.182)
Democracy	-0.004	0.024	-0.005	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-7.114*	-4.042	-7.181*	-3.609
	(3.778)	(5.198)	(3.804)	(5.328)
Ethnic Fractionalization Sq.	7.502*	3.268	7.575*	2.715
	(3.934)	(5.429)	(3.963)	(5.558)
Civil War	0.300	0.383	0.328	0.465
	(0.549)	(0.651)	(0.553)	(0.663)
Oil Producer	-0.196	0.022	-0.289	-0.131
	(0.628)	(0.631)	(0.629)	(0.631)
Past Intervention	-0.029***	-0.032**	-0.030***	-0.028*
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.0113)	(0.017)
Constant	-14.64***	-9.841***	-15.42***	-10.64***
	(2.722)	(1.895)	(2.755)	(2.011)
Observations	1,933	1,430	1,933	1,430

Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over dyad appear in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%**.** All independent variables are lagged at t-1.

Table 3. HRO Shaming and Humanitarian Interventions

	Rare Event Logit		Logit with GEE	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
HRO Shaming (intensity)	0.308***	0.227**	0.322***	0.235**
	(0.079)	(0.111)	(0.079)	(0.115)
Human Rights	0.984***	0.967***	1.025***	1.013***
	(0.219)	(0.202)	(0.221)	(0.202)
Media Exposure	0.539**		0.556**	
	(0.264)		(0.268)	
Negative News Media Coverage		0.007		-0.071
		(0.093)		(0.111)
State Capacity	-0.805***	-0.510***	-0.858***	-0.554***
	(0.250)	(0.149)	(0.252)	(0.160)
Democracy	-0.002	0.029	-0.002	0.025
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-5.706	-3.352	-5.693	-2.876
	(4.170)	(5.169)	(4.170)	(5.285)
Ethnic Fractionalization Sq.	6.165	2.726	6.203	2.140
	(4.185)	(5.336)	(4.191)	(5.454)
Civil War	0.201	0.319	0.251	0.399
	(0.497)	(0.596)	(0.499)	(0.610)
Oil Producer	-0.114	-0.029	-0.200	-0.148
	(0.621)	(0.657)	(0.619)	(0.665)
Past Intervention	-0.029**	-0.032**	-0.028**	-0.026
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Constant	-15.03***	-9.410***	-15.90***	-10.22***
	(2.869)	(1.923)	(2.916)	(2.048)
Observations	1,933	1,430	1,933	1,430

Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over dyad appear in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%**.** All independent variables are lagged at t-1.

Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of Humanitarian Intervention

Pr **(Humanitarian Intervention=1)**			
	Baseline	Unit Change	New Value (%Δ)
HRO Shaming (count)	0.006	mean + 1σ	0.010 (67%)
HRO Shaming (intensity)	0.006	mean + 1σ	0.011 (83%)
Human Rights	0.006	mean + 1σ	0.017 (183%)
Media Exposure	0.006	mean + 1σ	0.016 (166%)
State Capacity	0.006	mean + 1σ	0.002 (–67%)
Past Intervention	0.006	mean + 1σ	0.004 (–33%)

Table 5. HRO Shaming and Humanitarian Interventions (Rare event logit)

	IGO-led Interventions		Non-IGO Interventions	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
HRO Shaming (count)	0.160**	0.212***	0.382**	0.587***
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.155)	(0.238)
Human Rights	0.873***	1.037***	1.140**	1.137***
	(0.193)	(0.218)	(0.471)	(0.418)
Media Exposure	0.590***		1.254**	
	(0.222)		(0.526)	
Negative News Media Coverage		-0.003		0.015
		(0.099)		(0.185)
State Capacity	-0.835***	-0.565***	-1.096***	-0.368
	(0.203)	(0.171)	(0.349)	(0.290)
Democracy	0.022	0.057*	-0.053	-0.013
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.063)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-7.796**	-4.697	-7.575	-4.221
	(3.728)	(5.090)	(6.293)	(5.613)
Ethnic Fractionalization Sq.	8.416**	4.490	7.677	3.868
	(3.986)	(5.437)	(6.791)	(6.118)
Civil War	0.317	0.097	0.041	0.248
	(0.419)	(0.559)	(0.869)	(0.900)
Oil Producer	-0.855	-0.585	0.681	0.210
	(1.211)	(1.005)	(0.783)	(0.738)
Past Intervention	-0.028**	-0.028*	-0.034***	-0.059**
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.029)
Constant	-14.92***	-9.990***	-23.16***	-9.543***
	(2.535)	(1.912)	(5.625)	(2.028)
Observations	1,933	1,430	1,933	1,430

Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over dyad appear in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%**.** All independent variables are lagged at t-1.

Table 6. HRO Shaming and Humanitarian Interventions (Rare event logit)

	IGO-led Interventions		Non-IGO Interventions	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
HRO Shaming (intensity)	0.083*	0.119**	0.180	0.275***
	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.134)	(0.107)
Human Rights	0.896***	1.050***	1.289**	1.277***
	(0.185)	(0.216)	(0.613)	(0.477)
Media Exposure	0.570**		1.205**	
	(0.226)		(0.564)	
Negative News Media Coverage		-0.0004		0.039
		(0.098)		(0.149)
State Capacity	-0.823***	-0.551***	-0.954***	-0.190
	(0.206)	(0.173)	(0.308)	(0.286)
Democracy	0.026	0.058*	-0.049	0.001
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-7.623**	-4.487	-6.057	-3.254
	(3.818)	(5.068)	(6.569)	(5.497)
Ethnic Fractionalization Sq.	8.288**	4.310	6.222	3.384
	(4.082)	(5.408)	(6.834)	(5.985)
Civil War	0.273	0.061	-0.168	0.084
	(0.406)	(0.548)	(0.929)	(0.847)
Oil Producer	-0.998	-0.533	0.475	-0.003
	(1.590)	(0.947)	(0.832)	(0.768)
Past Intervention	-0.027**	-0.028*	-0.032**	-0.057**
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.027)
Constant	-14.83***	-9.960***	-22.57***	-8.984***
	(2.561)	(1.965)	(5.436)	(1.944)
Observations	1,933	1,430	1,933	1,430

Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over dyad appear in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%**.** All independent variables are lagged at t-1.